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The maritime industry depends on automation to quickly and efficiently perform each task required to load, navigate, and ultimately unload a vessel. Operators of these automated systems could work for the vessel itself, the different ports the vessel visits, or the logistics, maintenance, or service support companies it interacts with along the way. Many will be distant from the ship or port, using remote technology to perform their work. Larger merchant vessels further require operational technology (OT) networks to ensure a seamless, profitable voyage. These include systems relating to ballast, stability, cargo, propulsion, power, navigation, and weather systems.
Ironically, these essential systems can be turned into weapons against the operators. It is quite possible for a savvy and resourced attacker to create a pollution incident, disrupt ports and critical infrastructure, or cause harm to the ship itself. The complexity of these systems isn’t unique to vessels either. Sprawling networks amalgamated into a “system of systems” are used by ports, terminals, and vendors. Each can create vectors for cyber-attacks in and of themselves or through connections to other supply systems.
Cyber-criminals are brazenly targeting the maritime community, and their attacks have become prolific. In 2020, cyberattacks affecting the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) increased by 400%, with a 900% increase over the prior three years. Even the International Maritime Organization (IMO) experienced what it called a “sophisticated cyber-attack” that took down its web portal in September 2020.
As indicated above, there are many possible vectors for infecting maritime systems. Security researchers believe that electronic chart display and information systems sometimes used on MTS vessels are vulnerable to attack, which are frequently linked to OPS-connected autopilots. This in tum can provide access to some OT systems lacking in adequate defenses. For instance, hackers allegedly compromised the steering and maneuver controls of a German-owned container vessel in February 2017, and an IT team was forced to come aboard to help the crew regain control.
If you were watching the automatic identification system (AIS) in 2021, you might have noticed two NATO warships
just two miles from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet headquarters. But eyewitnesses and webcams proved both ships were tied to a pier almost 200 miles away, demonstrating a capability to compromise navigation equipment. The incident received global attention and was attributed to AIS spoofing techniques, displaying vessels where none were present.
Ransomware has also hit the MTS when global shipping and logistics giant Maersk fell victim to the devastating “Not-Petya” cyberattacks of 2017, bringing Maersk’s global operations to a standstill. The fact that Maersk was not even the intended target of the attack underscores how vulnerable the MTS is. Criminal gangs aggressively exploited vulnerabilities at the Port of Antwerp, collecting payments from fraudulent bills of lading on its information systems for two years.
Against this backdrop of costly cyber-attacks and mischief, the federal government has issued several laws, directives, and advisories designed to improve national cyber-hygiene. In May 2021. the Biden administration’s Executive Order 14028 mandated federal agencies to secure their cloud services, adopt “zero-trust” architectures, and deploy multifactor authentication and encryption on federal networks. It also established software development security standards, using the federal government’s purchasing power to force industry to build more secure IT products.
The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) issued detailed guidance on how to develop incident response plans (IRPs) for the inevitable cyber-attacks. IRPs define the “players” for different response situations, their roles in an attack, and immediate actions to take. While not yet a requirement for the MTS, IRPs are strongly recommended for victims to have an organized means of quickly “fighting back”.
The U.S. Coast Guard recently released the Maritime Cybersecurity Assessment & Annex Guide (MCAAG) to help MTS stakeholders address cyber risks. This voluntary guide addresses cybersecurity assessments and IRP development, particularly for Facility Security Assessments and Facility Security Plans required by MTSA. In 2021, the Coast Guard released an updated version of the Cyber Strategic Outlook (CSO), placing responsibility to “prevent and respond” to MTS cyber incidents on its shore commanders. One notable statement in the CSO is that it will use its “existing framework for prevention and response activities to mitigate cyber risks,” which allows the Coast Guard to use its Captain of the Port authorities to prescribe cybersecurity conditions and restrictions for shore facilities before an incident and oversight afterward.
One important new statute is the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA), which created reporting requirements for “covered entities” who operate “critical infrastructure” in 16 sectors designated under federal law, including transportation systems and commercial facilities. CIRCIA requires these entities to report cyber-incidents and payments to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA). CIRCIA’s regulations will be announced in the next year, so details are uncertain. At a minimum, covered entities must report cybersecurity events within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours.
The MTS is still uniquely vulnerable to cyber-attack and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. While these new federal requirements will improve our defenses, they also present a host of compliance challenges for the maritime industry. That in tum will mean a significant investment in cyber defense and resiliency efforts. At a minimum, vessels, ports, terminals, suppliers, and maintainers should examine their networks and prepare now. If an entity lacks firewalls, or multi- factor authentication, or tailored IRPs, or encryption for its sensitive documents, it should invest now.
References
The Atlantic Council, RAISING THE COLORS: Signaling for Cooperation on Maritime Cybersecurity, October 2022.
Chris C. Demchak and Michael L. Thomas, War on the Rocks, October 15, 2021, Can’t Sail Away From Cyber Attacks: ‘Sea-Hacking’ From Land, https://warontherocks. com/2021I10/cant-sail-away-from-cyber-attacks-sea-hacking-from htps://warontherocks.com2021/10/cant-sail-away-from-cyber-attacks-seahacking-from-land/-land/.
H.I. Sutton, “Positions of Two NATO Ships Were Falsified Near Russian Black Sea Naval Base,” USNI News, 21 June 2021.
John Filitz, Maritime Port Systems Cybersecurity Vulnerability; NMIO Bulletin Vol. 13, March 2019 .
https:/www.dco.uscg.milPortals/9/CG-FAC/Documents/Maritime%20Cyber%20Assessment%20%20Annex%20Guide%20(MCAAG)_released%2023JAN2023.pdf?ver=NE11YULspj_kNa3xRoMd0TQ3D%3D
United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategic Outlook (Washington, DC: Coast Guard Headquarters, August 2021).
LT Rachel Ault, USCG, The Coast Guard Needs Stronger Policy to Prevent Maritime Cyber-Attacks, USN Proceedings, February 2022.
Id., pg. 28; “Security of Waterfront Facilities and Vessels in Port,” 33 C.FR. §6.1-1(2016)
The Author: Price Gene F. Price has substantial real-world experience in cybersecurity and focuses on Frost Brown Todd’s privacy and data security practice and incident response planning. Recently retired from the U.S. Navy as a Rear Admiral after 36 years of service.




